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Households can differ in size and needs. A reliable assessment of inequality in living standards, 
therefore,  necessitates  the  conversion  of  the  original  heterogeneous  into  an  artificial  quasi-
homogeneous population. Ebert and Moyes (2003) and Shorrocks (2004) theoretically explore the 
properties of two conversion strategies, i.e., to calculate household equivalent incomes and then to 
weight household units by their size vs. their needs. We use data from the Luxembourg Income 
Study for examining the sensitivity of the Gini and the Theil index to the chosen conversion 
strategy, and explain our results by means of an inequality decomposition by household types. 
Country inequality rankings are sensitive to the conversion strategy applied. The decomposition 
analysis reveals the underlying mechanisms. We find inequality estimates typically to be lower in the 
size-weighted distribution compared to needs-weighting. This is driven by relatively higher weights 
of large household units in case of size weighting in combination with inequality being typically 
below average among households with children.  
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1 Introduction 
Researchers and the public are eager to know about the distribution of living standards in a 
society. The living standard is determined by the material comfort goods and services 
available to each person provide. Household income or per capita income information, 
however, is a biased proxy for the level of material comfort when comparisons involve 
heterogeneous household types as multi-member household units can share and pool 
resources. The concept of equivalent incomes addresses this issue. Equivalent incomes are 
incomes that equalize the level of material comfort of persons living in different household 
types. Equivalent incomes are derived from household incomes using equivalence scales. 
Relative equivalence scales are deflators which make incomes of different household types 
comparable in terms of living standard. If a childless single adult serves as the reference 
household whose scale is set equal to one, relative equivalence scales measure the income 
needs of households relative to an equivalent adult. Alternatively, an absolute equivalence 
scale is the difference in the income of any household type and the equivalent income of a 
reference household type.  
Based on household-level income data, the one-member-household equivalent income 
of a household unit can be assigned to each of its members and all individuals of an economy 
can be treated as if living in separate one-member households. Inequality indices, then, 
quantify inequality of living standards among artificial quasi-homogeneous individuals. Two 
types of inequality indices can be distinguished. Relative indices, indices which remain 
invariant under equi-proportionate income variations, and absolute indices, indices which are 
invariant to equal absolute changes in all incomes. In accordance with the predominant part 
of the empirical literature on inequality, the remainder of this article solely focuses on 
relative inequality indices and relative equivalence scales. 
Although one might assess the assignment of the one-member-household equivalent 
income to each household member as most plausible or natural, such a conversion is not 
innocuous from a normative perspective. Ebert and Moyes (2003) study the implications of 
two normative conditions. According to reference independence, welfare or inequality 
comparisons should not be affected by a change of the reference household type, e.g. 
switching from a solitary adult to a couple. The application of reference-type-independence 
restricts admissible equivalence scales to be independent-of-base.  Concerning relative 
equivalence scales, independence-of-base (IB) implies identical household-size economies 
across all levels of household material comfort. Relative equivalence scales of the IB type are 
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standard in welfare and inequality analyses, and have been introduced independently by 
Lewbel (1989) and Blackorby and Donaldson (1993). According to the between-type-
transfer-principle, an income transfer reducing the differences in living standards (equivalent 
incomes) between two households and not affecting the households’ ranking by living 
standards, should always lead to a social improvement (cf. Ebert and Moyes, 2003, p. 331). 
Then, equivalent income can no longer be assigned to each household member. Instead, 
equivalent income must be assigned to a factor that is equal (proportional) to its equivalence 
scale. In case of relative equivalence scales, the outcome is a quasi-homogeneous distribution 
that depicts inequality of livings standards among equivalent adults. The key advantage of 
this type of conversion is that transfers leave the total equivalent income in the distribution of 
equivalent adults unaltered. On the contrary, in the distribution of one-member-households 
equivalent incomes, transfers between different household types change total equivalent 
income. 
  In this article, we contrast relative inequality estimates derived from both types of 
quasi homogeneous distributions for the class of IB relative equivalence scales. Inequality is 
measured by means of the Theil and the Gini index, both being among the most popular 
inequality measures in applied research. Estimates are provided for an extensive set of 
countries, and for various levels of household-size economies. Theil and Gini indices turn out 
to be sensitive to the chosen conversion procedure, and differences in the estimates are 
sufficiently large to change country inequality rankings – including reasonable levels of 
household-size economies. An inequality decomposition by household types reveals that this 
is due to an empirical regularity: compared to smaller household units, equivalent incomes of 
larger units tend to be distributed more equally. 
  Here is a roadmap to our paper. In Section 2, we suggest a useful benchmark scenario 
for investigating why needs-weighted inequality estimates are higher, and introduce the key 
concepts underlying our empirical analysis. In Section 3, we briefly explain our database and 
present our empirical results. Section 4 concludes the paper. 
 
2 Preliminary considerations 
2.1 A useful benchmark 
Taking the one-member household as the reference, a relative equivalence scale gives the 
percentage change in household income required to maintain the living standard of each 




economies are achieved, the percentage change in household income which holds the living 
standard of a household’s members constant is less than the percentage increase in family 
size. In practice, the ‘correct’ levels of household size economies are still under discussion. 
We apply a parametric equivalence scale suggested in Buhmann et al. (1988) allowing for 
variation in household-size economies through a single parameter, the ‘equivalence-scale 
elasticity.’ The Buhmann et al. (1988) relative equivalence scale is  , where 
 denotes the number of household members in a type- household. Hence, household-size 
economies are represented by the catch-all parameter 
() (
θ θ h h n n ES = , )
h n h
θ , with  1 0 ≤ ≤θ , and no distinction is 
made between the financial needs of adults and children. However, in the decomposition 
analysis that follows, household types are defined both by the number of adults and children. 
Distinguishing between adults and children is useful as it reveals the mechanism that drives 
the differences in needs versus size-weighted inequality estimates. Varying  θ  is useful for 
investigating the robustness of our results.  
Let κ  denote a single household observation of size  , and let   denote household 
income. Then 
κ n κ x
()
θ
κ κ κ n x y =  gives the one-member household equivalent income of κ . A 
distribution of artificial one-member-household equivalent incomes, a size-weighted 
equivalent income distribution (“S-weighted distribution”), is derived from the original 
heterogeneous household-income distribution by calculating, for each household unit, its 
one-member household equivalent income and weighting each household observation by the 
number of its members. Hence, if household monthly income is US$2,000, the number of 
family members is four and the equivalence-scale elasticity is 0.5, the resulting equivalent 
income isUS$2,000 4 US$1,000
θ =  and the household is weighted by four. 
As demonstrated by Ebert and Moyes (2003), S-weighting is incompatible with the 
between-type-transfer-principle. The between-type-transfer-principle imposes that an income 
transfer, which reduces the difference in equivalent incomes of persons living in two different 
household units, must not increase inequality. The (non)-compatibility of the between-type-
transfer-principle and principles such as utilitarianism, maximin or leximin is discussed in 
Ebert and Moyes (2003, pp. 331f.). A basic objection one can raise against the between-type-
transfer-principle is that it ignores the number household members affected by the transfer. 
Accepting the between-type-transfer-principle, however, means that ‘size weighting’ is 
inappropriate. Instead, for relative inequality comparisons the equivalent income of a 
household unit must be calculated and households be weighted by a factor equal or 
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proportional to the households’ equivalence scales, which again must be of type IB and 
relative. To facilitate the economic interpretation, we weight each household by the 
household’s relative equivalence scale (by its “needs”). The outcome is a needs-weighted 
equivalent income distribution (“N-weighted distribution”). Considering the previous 
example, this means that the equivalent income of US$1,000 is weighted by 2.0. 
Concerning the level of household size economies, two extreme cases can be 
considered. In the first case, let the within-household production technology be such that full 
household-size economies are achieved ( 0 = θ ). Then, for all household types, household 
income equals equivalent income as  ( ) H h ES ,..., 1 1 0 nh, = ∀ = = θ , so that ‘  household 
members live as cheap as one.’ Weighting household income by the number of household 
members gives the S-weighted distribution. N-weighting, on the opposite, requires household 
units to be weighted according to the number of equivalent adults (equivalence scales). For 
n
0 = θ , the number of equivalent adults is the same for all household size, namely 1.0, and the 
N-weighted distribution and the original distribution of household incomes coincide. In the 
second special case, let the within-household production technology be such that no 
household-size economies can be achieved ( 1 = θ ). Then, equivalence scales and the number 
of household members are always the same,  ( ) n n ES h h 1 , H h ,..., 1 = ∀ = = θ , and the S-
weighted and the N-weighted distribution coincide. Hence, this scenario can serve as a 
benchmark for studying the differences in inequality estimates derived from S- and N-
weighted distributions.   
 
2.2 Implications for inequality 
Let us consider a heterogeneous population, where  h Κ denotes the number of household 
observations pertaining household type h.  Then,   is the total number of artificial 
one-member households, and   is the total number of artificial equivalent 
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These different characteristics of the S- and the N-weighted distribution have 
immediate implications for inequality estimates. For example, think of a heterogeneous 
population with many equally rich one-member households (in terms of equivalent income), 
and one poor multi-member household. Then the N-weighted distribution Lorenz dominates 
the S-weighted, and size-weighted relative inequality estimates would indicate more 
inequality than needs-weighted estimates. Yet, if the inequality measure is consistent with the 
population principle,
1  within-subgroup relative inequality, inequality among equal-type 
households, is immune to variations of θ  and the weighting procedure: for each two equal-
type households, ratios of population shares and of equivalent incomes always remain the 
same. Yet, what will typically change is inequality between household types. Decomposing 
inequality by household types, therefore, may be helpful to study how and why inequality in 
the N- and S-weighted distribution differs.  
 
2.3 Decomposing inequality by subgroups 
Decomposability of an inequality measure implies a coherent relationship between inequality 
in the whole population and inequality in its constituent mutually exclusive subgroups. The 
basic idea is to express overall inequality as a function of inequality within and between its 
subgroups. An index is additively decomposable if it can be written as a weighted sum of the 
within-subgroup inequality indices plus a between-subgroup inequality term based on mean 
equivalent incomes and subgroup sizes. Obviously, it is quite exceptionable that an inequality 
index possesses such properties, but the Theil coefficient is a pleasant example. Other 
measures including the Gini coefficient are not additively decomposable, and a residual term 
remains.  
                                                           
1 According to the population principle, an inequality index should not be affected by an  ρ -fold replication of 
the same distribution ( 0 > ρ ). 
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Identifying subgroups of quasi-homogeneous households originating from households 
of equal type is the basic idea underlying our empirical analysis. This identification enables 
us to quantify how features of household-type specific income distributions affect inequality 
in living standards among artificial homogeneous units. Suppressing the N/S superscript, a 
decomposition of the Theil index, T ,  by population subgroups can be written as 
 
() , ln 1



























where   is the within-subgroup component, 
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is the Theil index of the subgroup constructed from household type h.
2 The within-subgroup 
component of equation (1) is the sum of the subgroup specific Theil indices (equation (2)), 
whereby each   is weighted by the population share   times  h T h p μ μh . The latter expression 
captures how far mean equivalent income of type-  households deviates from overall mean 
equivalent income. Inequality between subgroups is measured by the second term on the right 
hand side of (1), and is determined by the weighted sum of relative deviations of subgroup 
specific from overall mean equivalent income.  
h
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where   is the Gini index of the subgroup originating from type-h households, h G
3  h π  is the 
equivalent income share of   in total equivalent income (‘economic weight’), and   is the 
‘overlap term.’ Corresponding to the Theil decomposition, within-group inequality, as 
captured by the first term of equation (3), is represented by the weighted sum of subgroup 
specific Gini coefficients. Between-subgroup inequality is given by the sum of relative 
differences in mean equivalent incomes of any two subgroups,   and 
h
G O
h j , weighted by  j h p π , 
                                                           
2 See Cowell (1995), pp. 149-154, for details. 




whereby subgroups are ranked by mean equivalent income such that  h j μ μ > . Abstracting 
from  j h p π , the terms of the sum are the larger the bigger the relative differences in two 
subgroups’ mean equivalent incomes are, viz. comparing ‘rich’ and ‘poor’ subgroups. 
Finally, the third term of (3) measures the overlap of subgroups’ equivalent income 
distributions: ceteris paribus, the overlap is the higher the closer together the subgroup means 
of equivalent incomes are (see Lambert and Aranson, 1993, p. 1226).
4 
  In (1-3), some elements are invariant to the way the quasi-homogeneous population is 
constructed from the underlying heterogeneous one, namely  h μ s,  s, and  s. Others, 
listed below, are sensitive to the type of conversion:  











































































h p : fraction of one-member households in the S-weighted distribution originating 
from type h households;  
 
N
h p : fraction of equivalent adults in the N-weighted distribution originating from type 
h households;  
 
S




h π : equivalent income share in the N-weighted distribution originating from type h 
households; 
 
S μ : mean equivalent income per capita in the S-weighted distribution;  
 
N μ : mean equivalent income per equivalent adult in the N-weighted distribution. 
 
3 Sensitivity analysis 
3.1 Data 
                                                           
4 For a more detailed discussion on the decomposability of the Gini and the properties of its different 
components see, for example, Lambert and Decoster (2005) and references cited therein. 
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Our empirical examination is based on data from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS). For 
30 countries and several years, the LIS provides representative micro-level information on 
private households’ incomes and demographic characteristics (i.e., number, age and gender 
of each family member). To keep the empirical analysis tractable, only 20 countries (the US 
and 19 European countries) from a single LIS wave (1999/2000; see the Appendix Table A1 
for details) are considered. Additionally, only data from nine household types are taken into 
account: one- and two-adult households with zero up to three children, and childless three-
adult households.
5 As for some household types sample sizes are small, we also provide 
bootstrap estimates of the inequality coefficients’ sampling variances. 
Equivalent incomes are based on the LIS variable ‘household disposable income’ 
(DPI).  DPI is harmonized across countries, covers labor earnings, property income, and 
government transfers in cash minus income and payroll taxes.
6 All DPIs reported are denoted 
in local currencies and prices. To meet the restrictions on the income domain imposed by 
Ebert and Moyes (2003) and Shorrocks (2004), only households with positive DPIs are 
considered. For each household type and country separately, Table 1a provides the number of 
observations (not weighted),
7 the fraction of the country-wide populations living in the same 
household type (weighted by household weights), and the average disposable household 
income per month (weighted by household weights). In addition, Table 1b summarizes some 
further aggregate features of the resulting country data bases, including the total number of 
observations (non-weighted), average household income, average household size and the 
fraction of the country population actually living in the nine household types. It turns out that 
the coverage is satisfactory well in all 20 countries we study, never falling below 60 percent. 
 
[Table 1a about here] 
[Table 1b about here] 
 
3.2 Descriptive statistics of country-specific quasi-homogeneous distributions 
This section summarizes several features of the country equivalent-income distributions, all 
of them constituting elements of Theil and Gini indices. Figure 1 depicts the ratio 
                                                           
5 We use the LIS variables ‘d4’ and ‘d27’ to distinguish adults from children, where ‘d27’ gives the number of 
household members of age below 18 and ‘d4’ denotes the total number of household members. 
6 For the exact DPI definition see Luxembourg Income Study (2006), and for its cross-country comparability 
Burkhauser et al. (1996) and references therein. 
7 We provide the unweighted number of observations to give the reader a clear picture of the actual numbers of 







h p p along the dimension of θ . The figure shows how much size- and needs weighted 
subgroup population shares differ. Estimates referring to the same country are connected by 
an interpolated line. Symbols and formats of lines (dashed vs. solid) distinguish estimates 
across countries. As the Buhman et al. (1988) equivalence scale makes no distinction 




h p p  
estimates coincide for household types 
  A1C1 and A2C0,  
  A1C2, A2C1 and A3C0, and for 
  A1C3 and A2C2, 
where ‘A’ denotes ‘adult,’ ‘C’ denotes ‘child,’ and the adjacent figure gives the respective 
number of household members. Accordingly, the five graphs in Figure 1 convey all the 
empirical findings.  
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 




h p p -curves are always downwards sloped. For two-member households (A1C1 and 




h p p  and θ : In most countries, the 




h p p -
curves are upwards sloped. These patterns can be explained by country demographics. 



































































Whenever  1 < θ  and there is at least one multi-member household, the ratio  n ES  is smaller 
than 1.0. Moreover, for any multi-member household type,  n ES  is increasing in θ  as 
0 > ∂ ∂ θ h ES . As  h h ES n  is equal to 1.0 in case of one-member households, the population 




h p p  with  1 = h n , is strictly monotonically 





h p p  as  h h ES n  is decreasing in θ , thus mitigating the  n ES  effect. 
Empirically, it turns out that  n ES  is more sensitive to a θ  variation than   h ES h n  if 
n nh >> : For household types of size   (A1C2-A1C3, A2C1-A2C3 and A3C0),  3 h n ≥
SN
hh p p  
is strictly  decreasing in θ . In the case where  2 h n ≤  (subgroups A1C1 and A2C0), 
household size is less or almost equal to average size n. If  n nh << , 
SN
hh p p is strictly 
monotonically increasing in θ . For household types sized about the population average, 




h p p -curve is u-shaped: This applies especially to Norway ( 99 . 1 = n ) and 





h p p  relationships have immediate implications for inequality, as can be 
seen from equations (1-3). Consider, for example, the between-subgroup component. Here 
we have that the weights assigned to differences in subgroup-specific mean equivalent 
incomes are contingent upon the type of conversion. But subtle differences even arise 
concerning the classification of ‘rich’ or ‘poor’ subgroups.’ Following equation (1), one can 
call subgroup h  
  ‘rich’ if  1 >
S
h μ μ ; respectively if  1 >
N
h μ μ , 
  ‘poor’ if  1 <
S
h μ μ ; respectively if  1 <
N
h μ μ . 
Figure 2 encompasses such ratios in nine separate graphs, containing six lines each. Solid 
lines are estimates of equivalent-income ratios derived from the S-weighted distribution; 
dashed lines from the N-weighted distribution. For each type of conversion, three lines are 




and the lower line the respective minimum. The line in between represents the cross-country 
mean. With the exception of the needs-weighted A2C0 subgroup, lines referring to subgroups 
originating from one- or two-member households are always upward sloping. Hence, these 
subgroups become ‘richer’ as θ  goes up. For all other subgroups, downward sloping lines 
imply that they become relatively ‘poorer’ as economies of scale become less important. 
According to our definition of ‘rich’ and ‘poor,’ A1C0-A1C3 subgroups are notably poor. 
Across all countries, average equivalent income of the A1C1 subgroup (A1C3 subgroup) is 
about 28 percent (50 percent) below the average when  6 . 0 = θ  ( 0.55 θ = ) – irrespective of 
whether households are needs or size weighted.  
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
Subgroups’ population and equivalent income ratios again determine the overall mean 
equivalent income ratio: mean equivalent income per one-member household divided by 












N S p p
1 1
μ μ μ μ , again as functions of θ . For all countries, the 
N S μ μ -curve 
is downward-sloping for low values of θ , intersects the 1.0-threshold line from above at 
some medium level of θ , and then converges against the threshold line from below. This 
pattern is the aggregate outcome of the relationships presented in Figures 1 and 2. 

















































plotted against θ . For all countries, the 
SN
hh π π -curves are positively sloped for subgroups 
A1C0, A1C1 and A2C0, and negatively sloped else. As can be seen from equation (9), this 
pattern is caused by the interaction of the relationships presented in Figures 1 and 3. 
 
[Figure 4 about here] 
 
3.3 Sensitivity of inequality estimates 
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3.3.1 Theil index 
Figure 5 presents our main results for the Theil index. The upper left graph depicts the ratio 
N S T T plotted against admissible values of θ . In a predominant number of countries, 
N T  
exceeds 
S T  and the ratio 
N S T T increases in θ . Only in Poland, Norway and Sweden and 
for high values of θ  ,  1 >
N S T T . Relative differences between 
S T  and 
N T  can be 
substantial. For example, the index ratio is about 0.83 for  10 . 0 = θ in Slovenia, Belgium and 
Ireland. Moreover, ratios differ substantially across countries. For example,  02 . 1
S =
N T T  in 
Poland and 0.93 in Ireland for  60 . 0 = θ . As we will show in Section 3.4, these cross-country 
differences are sufficiently large to affect country inequality rankings.  
  To understand the relationship presented in the upper left graph of Figure 5, we also 
depict the ratios of size- and needs-weighted within- and between-subgroup component. The 
within-subgroup component ratio concerning the Theil index, 
N T S T W W
, , , as defined in 
equation (1) is depicted in the upper right graph. Like the 
N S T T -ratio, the 
N T S T W W
, , -
ratio increases in θ , and is usually smaller than 1.0. Compared to the N-weighted 
distribution, the population share of inequality-diminishing groups, therefore, must be higher 
in the S-weighted distribution. As size-weighting attaches larger weights to multi-member 
household units, equivalent-incomes of ‘large’ households should be distributed more 
equally. Indeed, subgroup-specific Theil indices – provided in Table 2 – give empirical 
support: Especially children tend to have an inequality-reducing effect. Only Poland, Norway 
and Sweden deviate from this empirical regularity. And, exactly in these three countries, the 
N T S T W W
, , -ratio is non-increasing in θ .  
 
[Figure 5 about here] 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
  Finally, turning to the between-group component of the Theil index, the lower left 
graph of Figure 5 gives the 
N T S T B B
, , - ratio as defined in equation (1). For small values of 
θ , 
N T S T B B
, , is substantially smaller than 1.0. For example, across all countries, 
74 . 0
, , ≤
N T S T B B at  0 = θ . The 
N T S T B B
, , -ratio is s-shaped in θ  , crossing the 1.0-threshold 
line for medium levels of θ  (reaching a cross-country peak of  15 . 1 ≈  for  55 . 0 = θ  in 
Switzerland), and then again converging to  1
, , =




due to mutually enforcing and mitigating effects resulting from the patterns depicted in 
Figures 1-4. 
 
3.3.2 Gini index 
Analogously to the Theil-index ratios presented in Figure 5, Gini-index ratios are plotted in 
Figure 6. The graph top left gives the Gini-index ratio, 
N S G G ; up right depicts the 
between-subgroup ratio, 
N G S G B B
, , ; down left the within-subgroup ratio, 
N G S G W W
, , ; down 
right the overlap-component ratios, 
,, GS GN OO, all defined in equation (3). Several 
parallelisms to the results concerning the Theil index occur. First, with the only exception 
being Poland,  , like 
N G
N T , signals more inequality than its S-weighted analogue, and this 
effect intensifies as θ  decreases (see upper left graph of Figure 6). The ratios 
N S T T  and 
N S G G  are even similarly sized. Second, the within- and the between subgroup ratios of the 
Theil and the Gini index change in a likewise manner: the increase of the within-subgroup 
component ratio in θ  (see graph bottom left) as well as the s-shape of the between-subgroup-
component ratio (see graph up right) is reconfirmed.  
The within- and the between-component ratios for the two indices, however, differ 
slightly. For most countries and values of θ , 
N T S T N G S G W W W W
, , , , < and 
N T S T N G S G B B B B
, , , , < . This can be explained by the overlap-component ratio, 
,, GS GN OO, 
capturing some of the variation. Overlaps are sensitive to the transformation procedure as 
equivalent-income distributions’ overlaps of any two subgroups are weighted differently, by 
S
h p  vs. 
N
h p .  
 
[Figure 6 about here] 
 
3.4 Inequality parades 
Figure 7 illustrates the implications of size vs. needs weighting for cross-country 
comparisons of inequality. Two ‘inequality parades’ for each index are provided – one for the 
S- and one for the N-weighted distribution. Parades are obtained by sorting countries 
according to their index.
8 The country with equivalent incomes being most equally 
                                                           
8 Such a ranking ignores the possibility that average equivalent-income levels differ across countries. So, a 
country – such as the US – is at the bottom of the ranking although average equivalent income in the US is 
among the highest. 
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distributed is assigned a ‘1,’ the country with the most unequal distribution a ‘20.’ The upper 
two graphs give country rankings by the Theil index, the graphs below by the Gini index. As 
demonstrated in previous literature (cf. for example Coulter et al. (1992), Burkhauser et al. 
(1996), Aaberge and Melby (1998), Duclos and Makdissi (2005)), rankings are sensitive to 
the chosen index and equivalence-scale elasticity. In addition, it turns out that the conversion 
method itself has an impact on the inequality parade. 
 
[Figure 7 about here] 
 
  Let the sequence of ranks reported be [ ]
N S N S G G T T , , ,
4 . 0
. Then, taking Germany as an 
example, the numbers are [  when  ] 7,8,9,10 = θ , and [ ] 6,7,9,10  when  2 . 0 = θ ; 
[ ] 10,10,8,8  and [ ] 8,9,5,5  in case of Switzerland. Size- and needs-weighted rankings, by 
definition, coincide for  0 . 1 = θ , Yet, in case of the Theil (Gini) index, rankings already 
become different for  95 . 0 ≤ θ  ( 0.85 θ < ). The sensitivity of inequality indices to the 
conversion method is illustrated in Table 3. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
Here we provide the frequency and size of country re-rankings, and also Kendall's rank 
correlation coefficients of inequality rankings under S- and N-weighting. Consider, for 
example the entry in column labeled ‘1’ (‘-2’) and row  25 . 0 = θ  in case of the Theil index. 
Here we have a value of ‘3’ (‘1’). This entry means: three countries (one country) ascend 
(descend) one rank (two ranks) in the parade when switching from a conversion by size to 
needs.
9 Column ‘Sum’ gives the sum of the following product: number of ascends times 
frequency of occurrence. For example, consider the entry in row ‘ 0.20,G θ = .’ There we 
have the value  9 1 3 2 3 = ⋅ + ⋅  as three countries ascend two and three ascend one rank. These 
descriptive findings illustrate that, indeed, inequality rankings are sensitive to conversion 
schemes. Kendall’s rank correlation coefficients give confirmative evidence. In case of the 
Theil index (Gini index), Kendall’s ranking correlation coefficient decreases in θ  when θ  is 
low, reaching a minimum of 91.58 (84.21) for  1 . 0 = θ , and then tends to increase in θ . 
                                                           




  We want to conclude with a comparison of N- vs. S-weighted inequality estimates 
when  5 . 0 = θ . In this case, the Buhman et al. (1988) equivalence scale is equivalent to the 
“square root scale’ which has been used extensively in the measurement of inequality. Table 
4 summarizes our findings. Differences in inequality estimates are most pronounced for 
Belgium and Ireland. Here, S- and N-weighted Theil indices differ by about two percentage 
points; Gini indices by more than one percentage points. Although even these differences 
may appear small, they can change country inequality rankings. Indeed, for  5 . 0 = θ , 
Rendall’s rank correlation coefficient for S- and N-weighted country ranking is 91.58 percent 
(90.53 percent) when the ranking criterion is the Theil (Gini) index. 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
4 Conclusion 
For 20 countries, we have presented inequality estimates for a size and a needs weighted 
quasi-homogeneous equivalent-income distribution. The theoretical properties of both 
distributions have been explored in Ebert and Moyes (2003) and Shorrocks (2004). Our 
empirical examination reveals that country inequality rankings are conversion sensitive for 
equivalence scales implying reasonable or usually applied within-household size economies. 
By means of a decomposition analysis, we have investigated the mechanisms and identified 
the key source that make needs and size weighted inequality estimates diverge. That 
inequality estimates are typically lower in the size-weighted distribution is driven by two 
effects: Higher weights of large household units in case of size weighting in combination 




Aaberge, R., and I. Melby: The sensitivity of income inequality to choice of 
equivalence scales, Review of Income and Wealth 44, 565-569 (1998) 
  Blackorby, C., and D. Donaldson: Adult-equivalence scales and the economic 
implementation of interpersonal comparisons of well-being, Social Choice and Welfare 10, 
335-361 (1993) 
  Buhmann, B., Rainwater, L., Schmauss, G., and T.M. Smeeding: Equivalence scales, 
well-being, inequality, and poverty: sensitivity estimates across ten countries using the 
Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) database, Review of Income and Wealth 34, 115-142 
(1988)  
  Burkhauser, R.V., Smeeding, T.M., and J. Merz: Relative inequality and poverty in 
Germany and the United States using alternative equivalence scales, Review of Income and 
Wealth 42, 381-400 (1996) 
  Coulter, F.A.E., Cowell, F.A., and S.P. Jenkins: Equivalence scale relativities and the 
extent of inequality and poverty, The Economic Journal 102, 1067-1082 (1992) 
  Cowell, F.A.: Measuring Inequality, Prentice Hall/Harvester Wheatsheaf, Second 
Edition, London (1995)  
  Duclos, J.-Y. and P. Makdissi: Sequential stochastic dominance and the robustness of 
poverty orderings, Review of Income and Wealth 51(1), 63–87 (2005) 
  Ebert, U., and P. Moyes: Equivalence scales reconsidered, Econometrica 71, 319-343 
(2003)  
  Lambert, P.J., and J.R. Aronson: Inequality decomposition analysis and the Gini 
coefficient revisited, The Economic Journal 103, 420, 1221-1227 (1993) 
  Lewbel, A.: Household equivalence scales and welfare comparisons, Journal of 
Public Economics 39, 377-391 (1989) 
Lambert, P.J., and A. Decoster: The Gini coefficient reveals more, Katholieke 
Universiteit Leuven, Center for Economic Studies, Discussion Paper 05.08 (2005) 
  Luxembourg Income Study: LIS summary income variables, http://lisproject.org/ 
techdoc/summary.pdf (2006) 
O’Higgins, M., Schmaus, G., and G. Stephenson: Income distribution and 
redistribution: a microdata analysis for seven countries, in: Smeeding, T.M., O’Higgins, M., 
and L. Rainwater (Eds.), Poverty, inequality and income distribution in comparative 




Podder, N., and S. Chatterjee: Sharing the national cake in post reform New Zealand: 
income inequality trends in terms of income sources, Journal of Public Economics 86, 1-27 
(2002) 
  Pyatt, G.: On the interpretation and disaggregation of Gini coefficients, The 
Economic Journal 86, 243-255 (1976) 
  Shorrocks, A.: Inequality and welfare evaluations of heterogeneous income 




   Table  1a. Sample description by subgroups 
Country 
code   A1C0 A1C1 A1C2 A1C3 A2C0 A2C1 A2C2 A2C3 A3C0 
AT 
Av. Income  18,487 20,097 23,553 21,427 33,947 37,827 39,098 40,678 46,562 
Number of obs.  577  45 24  2 671  157  221  61  201 
Pop. share  13.19  2.16 1.29 0.13  23.27 11.17 15.56  3.93  8.56 
BE 
Av. Income  48,384 56,229 68,968 68,910  105,543 120,479 129,142 145,594 135,953 
Number of obs.  603  35 25  7 636  174  265  96 96 
Pop. share  15.33  1.79 1.57 0.77  25.73 9.11 19.55 8.05  5.48 
EE 
Av. Income  2,527 3,599 3,559 3,011 5,088 6,912 7,789 7,577 6,857 
Number of obs.  1,102  166  69  21 1,650  610 523 139 600 
Pop. share  11.51  2.80 1.17 0.44  22.60 13.84 12.70  3.25  9.78 
FI 
Av. Income  6,456  8,905  10,280 11,970 13,709 16,379 18,293 19,124 18,527 
Number of obs.  2,047  157  89  26  3,523 1,032 1,219  531  782 
Pop. share  17.61  2.18 1.60 0.68  28.81 9.91 14.31 7.49  6.20 
FR 
Av. Income  8,198 9,150 9,825  11,237  14,581 16,807 18,322 19,660 19,803 
Number of obs.  2,640 219  125  35  3,278 879 1,086 417  659 
Pop. share  11.89  1.75 1.54 0.54  25.31 11.14 16.21  7.73  7.51 
DE 
Av. Income  2,653 2,553 2,489 3,050 5,097 5,667 6,315 6,252 6,560 
Number of obs.  3,016  220  104  21  3,573 1,029 1,082  304  688 
Pop. share  19.59  1.99 1.15 0.24  28.72 10.76 13.21  4.19  7.16 
GR 
Av. Income  205,401 274,788 280,460 931,000 313,643 525,043 546,649 462,313 504,929 
Number of obs.  676 16  14  1 1,071  295  447 71 490 
Pop. share  6.88 0.37 0.45 0.03  19.30 7.83 17.90 2.99 13.90 
HU 
Av. Income  41,048 45,528 73,045 46,183 75,090  107,245 106,213 100,825  99,466 
Number of obs.  409  22  7  2  556 154 176  40  220 
Pop. share  10.04  0.89 0.32 0.15  21.01 9.47 13.48 3.66 13.42 
IE 
Av. Income  947  835  945  872  1,693 2,278 2,428 2,826 2,401 
Number of obs.  480  37  25  8  565 156 242 163 175 
Pop. share  8.68 2.23 1.62 1.04  15.50 7.75 15.13 9.94  6.53 
IT 
Av. Income  1,892 2,658 2,477 2,333 3,310 3,842 3,761 3,703 4,536 
Number of obs.  1,454 53  19  6 2,157  667 759 141  1,078 
Pop. share  11.30  0.87 0.72 0.07  24.52 12.11 16.24  7.52  8.27 
LU 
Av. Income  95,813 95,662 98,881 55,312  151,190 160,868 180,183 182,237 204,340 
Number of obs.  583  30 13  2 735  270  255  96  190 
Pop. share  7.72 0.57 0.27 0.18  20.39 10.67 14.00  3.30  14.19 
NO 
Av. Income  13,234 19,298 20,611 23,188 28,545 34,234 38,259 41,981 41,671 
Number of obs.  2,811  299  128  32  3,670 1,114 1,514  703  1,008 
Pop. share  19.20  3.21 2.10 0.61  23.34 8.96 15.66 8.47  6.02 
PL 
Av. Income  833  1,173 1,177 1,161 1,506 1,783 1,834 1,575 1,862 
Number of obs.  4,285  544  300  112  7,205 3,394 3,673 1,306 2,909 
Pop. share  5.18 1.13 0.86 0.44  15.67 10.21 14.70  6.61  8.91 
RU 
Av. Income  1,291 2,467 2,150 1,128 2,713 3,899 3,993 5,847 3,451 
Number of obs.  611 122  29  2  775 417 235  30  244 
Pop. share  7.24 2.71 1.00 0.10  17.46 14.33 12.65  1.78  8.38 
SI 
Av. Income  81,577  116,695  129,707 --- 158,830  206,921 232,709 219,055 233,932 
Number of obs.  366  29 11 ---  844  304  389  57  566 
Pop. share  5.31 0.72 0.41 0.00  14.78 8.85 15.47 2.55 12.88 
ES 
Av. Income  136,816 148,559 183,587 262,288 244,017 303,077 335,658 375,155 329,689 
Number of obs.  818 22  11  3 1,368  462  474 80 522 
Pop. share  5.87 0.32 0.31 0.10  20.21 10.03 13.82  3.01  11.64 
Note. Disposable household incomes per month (weighted) and in local currencies. Number of observation is not weighted by LIS 
household weights. Pop. share gives the percentage of the total weighted population that is living in the household type. A denotes adult; 




Table 1a. continued 
Country 





10,444 14,222 16,859 18,363 22,793 26,192 30,401 30,736 32,141 
4,694 237  150  43  4,772 978 1,332 446  797 





4,013 4,290 4,684 4,477 6,777 6,763 6,943 7,267 7,852 
895  45  40  9 1,192  307 509 172 189 





907  878  966  988  1,725 1,970 2,282 2,160 2,438 
7,181  804 659 268  8,035  1,852  2,354  802  1,254 





2,029 2,117 2,266 1,886 3,995 4,511 4,870 4,672 4,935 
12,442 1,337  914  348  14,902 4,231 4,758 1,929 2,850 
10.18  2.17 2.25 1.12  23.90 10.20 14.98  7.15  6.67 
Note. Disposable household incomes per month (weighted) and in local currencies. Ns are non-weighted numbers of observations. Pop.
share gives the percentage of the total weighted population that is living in the household type. A denotes adult; C denotes child. The 
adjacent figure gives the respective number of household members. 
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Population share living in 
the nine household types
Average 
 household size 
AT 30,013  1,959  79.26  2.11 
BE 89,370  1,937  87.38  2.12 
EE 4,867  4,880  78.09  2.14 
FI 11,635  9,406  88.78  2.01 
FR 13,547  9,338  83.63  2.21 
DE 4,196  10,037  87.00  1.91 
GR 375,895  3,081  69.65  2.39 
HU 74,418  1,586  72.43  2.20 
IE 1,694  1,851  68.43  2.37 
IT 3,254  6,334  71.30  2.32 
LU 142,603  2,174  81.62  2.23 
NO 23,741  11,279  87.57  1.99 
PL 1,486  23,728  63.70  2.51 
RU 2,784  2,465  65.65  2.28 
SI 172,985  2,566  60.97  2.46 
ES 254,001  3,760  65.31  2.37 
SE 17,781  13,449  90.16  1.89 
CH 5,905  3,358  86.37  2.14 
UK 1,556  23,209  83.65  2.16 
US 3,543  43,711  78.63  2.24 
Note. Average disposable household incomes per month (weighted) of the 
household types taken into account, PPP adjusted in USD. N is the non-





Table 2. Theil coefficients by subgroups 
Countr
y code  A1C0 A1C1 A1C2 A1C3 A2C0 A2C1 A2C2 A1C3 A3C0 
AT  11.77  5.52 8.30 2.21  13.37 9.36  9.26 11.03  11.77 
(1.09) (1.42) (3.26) (1.11) (1.20) (2.22) (1.39) (3.39) (1.09) 
BE  16.59 7.82 10.71 3.47 80.04 13.90 10.98  8.44  16.59 
(3.90) (2.41) (3.76) (2.31)  (45.84)  (6.02) (1.58) (1.67) (3.90) 
EE  23.88 20.35 11.46  9.68  25.57 23.85 19.40 19.65 23.88 
(2.12) (5.50) (1.90) (2.29) (3.10) (3.14) (1.35) (4.03) (2.12) 
FI  14.37  7.25 4.50 4.38  15.15 9.04  8.41 12.38  14.37 
(2.22) (1.17) (0.74) (1.34) (3.27) (2.30) (1.67) (4.03) (2.22) 
FR  17.35 11.93  9.91  10.10 14.18 10.17 10.70 11.10 17.35 
(0.99) (1.55) (1.73) (2.88) (0.71) (0.68) (0.71) (1.17) (0.99) 
DE  17.66 8.77 14.71 2.70 13.89 10.32 13.37  8.84  17.66 
(1.66) (1.13) (3.02) (0.65) (0.90) (0.89) (4.09) (1.15) (1.66) 
GR  28.80 22.11 21.28  0.00  21.87 15.66 15.81 12.96 28.80 
(3.84) (7.88) (5.36) (0.00) (1.92) (1.47) (1.69) (2.66) (3.84) 
HU  21.54 18.17  4.72  4.51  14.77 20.56 12.11 14.53 21.54 
(4.38) (5.71) (1.64) (2.24) (1.62) (3.82) (1.32) (6.29) (4.38) 
IE  41.41  6.91 6.35 4.95  21.28  19.88 9.57 19.55  41.41 
(17.62)  (1.29) (2.04) (2.17) (1.86) (6.96) (1.28) (5.77)  (17.62) 
IT  22.99 12.20 14.68 15.78 23.81 15.31 16.07 35.64 22.99 
(2.68) (2.47) (4.54) (8.25) (2.65) (1.24) (1.43)  (11.18)  (2.68) 
LU  14.63 7.07 11.31 2.22 12.22 8.59 10.54 9.43 14.63 
(1.77) (1.24) (3.43) (1.11) (0.96) (0.67) (1.13) (1.73) (1.77) 
NO  14.33 11.82  5.79  2.68  17.36  7.44  12.82 26.18 14.33 
(1.05) (3.46) (1.22) (0.91) (2.45) (1.01) (4.67)  (11.35)  (1.05) 
PL  14.35 16.99 12.13 12.73 13.50 16.04 16.46 16.38 14.35 
(0.67) (1.81) (1.44) (3.37) (0.67) (0.65) (0.77) (1.39) (0.67) 
RU  41.17 45.63 35.57  0.00  52.46 51.95 31.95 60.62 41.17 
(6.14)  (6.48) (10.62) (0.00) (16.23)  (10.83) (2.68) (18.12) (6.14) 
SI  14.32  10.66  13.76 --- 14.00  8.96 8.15 7.15  14.32 
(1.37) (3.29) (4.74)  (---)  (1.30) (0.90) (1.26) (1.30) (1.37) 
ES  27.61 14.69 22.06 20.92 23.35 16.38 19.60 35.24 27.61 
(2.08) (5.05) (5.76)  (11.07)  (3.52) (2.25) (1.35) (8.84) (2.08) 
SE  13.09  9.56 5.62 4.28  10.38  8.78  19.25 10.43 13.09 
(0.77) (2.53) (1.31) (1.98) (0.59) (1.51)  (10.30)  (2.16) (0.77) 
CH  22.33 5.59 12.37 4.97 15.84  22.71 9.52 11.19  22.33 
(4.50) (1.26) (2.99) (1.28) (2.74)  (13.13)  (1.43) (1.63) (4.50) 
UK  32.85 10.06  9.36  6.06  22.60 16.25 23.69 19.90 32.85 
(6.51) (0.68) (0.95) (0.86) (1.13) (0.72) (3.38) (2.25) (6.51) 
US 
29.67 24.41 29.68 23.75 23.94 23.05 21.04 22.10 29.67 
(0.79) (3.21) (4.13) (3.30) (0.69) (1.05) (0.96) (1.23) (0.79) 
Note. A denotes adult; C denotes child. The adjacent figure gives the respective number of household members. Standard 





Table 3. Re-rankings 
θ   Index  Frequencies of re-rankings of specific 
magnitude 
Sum  Rank 
correlation 




     6  4  1     6  93.68 




      1 6 3 1 1    8  90.53 




     1  5  4  1   7  91.58 




    1  3  5      5  94.74 




    1  3  5      5  94.74 




   1  3  4  1     6  92.63 




      1 3 1 2      5  93.68 




      1 3 3 1      5  94.74 




      1 4 4 1      6  93.68 




     7  3  2     7  92.63 




      1 5 3 2      7  91.58 




      2 1 3 1      5  93.68 




      1 1 1 1      3  95.79 




     4  2  1     4  95.79 




     3  1  1     3  96.84 




     3  1  1     3  96.84 




       1  1       1  98.95 




       1  1       1  98.95 




       1  1       1  96.84 




       1  1       1  97.89 
          0 100.00 
Note. ‘Sum’ is a sum of five products. Each product is: magnitude of ascends 






Table 4. Inequality estimates for equivalence-scale elasticity of 0.5 
  Theil (in %)  Gini (in %) 
Country 
code  Size weighted  Needs 
weighted  Size weighted  Needs 
weighted 
AT  12.02 12.29 26.38 26.70 
(1.62) (1.03) (1.88) (1.11) 
BE  36.73 39.57 32.89 33.84 
(16.40) (29.05)  (4.15)  (7.24) 
EE  23.80 24.42 36.37 36.75 
(1.83) (1.96) (0.89) (0.98) 
FI  13.42 14.21 25.36 26.24 
(2.15) (2.07) (1.37) (1.66) 
FR  13.53 14.10 27.94 28.48 
(1.20) (1.17) (1.16) (1.04) 
DE  14.73 15.34 28.27 28.95 
(1.31) (1.36) (1.23) (1.03) 
GR  18.90 19.89 33.56 34.33 
(1.89) (2.45) (1.49) (1.92) 
HU  15.47 16.17 29.22 29.74 
(2.79) (1.95) (2.13) (1.41) 
IE  20.55 22.57 33.46 34.83 
(6.54) (1.55) (4.16) (1.06) 
IT  21.05 21.35 33.63 33.77 
(1.73) (1.99) (1.03) (1.12) 
LU  11.77 12.10 26.48 26.72 
(0.74) (0.99) (0.70) (0.88) 
NO  16.66 16.88 26.19 27.01 
(2.08) (1.67) (1.53) (1.08) 
PL  15.95 15.70 29.88 29.62 
(0.63) (0.63) (0.65) (0.63) 
RU  45.02 45.84 46.42 46.49 
(6.66) (6.49) (2.31) (2.11) 
SI  11.52 12.18 25.98 26.75 
(1.37) (1.47) (1.68) (1.67) 
ES  21.12 21.61 34.68 35.04 
(2.14) (3.04) (1.44) (1.88) 
SE  13.90 14.07 25.86 26.60 
(2.75) (2.44) (1.35) (1.50) 
CH  16.97 17.63 28.85 29.32 
(2.35) (2.53) (1.32) (1.31) 
UK  23.73 24.57 35.02 35.45 
(1.55) (2.30) (0.85) (0.98) 
US 
24.95 25.53 37.14 37.61 
(1.77) (1.46) (1.36) (1.14) 
































































































































































































































































Note: --- S-weighting; ⎯ N-weighting; A1C3 without Greece (one HH only) and Slovenia (no observations). 
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Appendix 
Table A1. Data files 
Country Country  code LIS-File 
Austria
a) AT at00h 
Belgium
a) BE  be00h 
Estonia EE ee00h 
Finland
a) FI  fi00h 
France
a) FR fr00h 
Germany
a) DE  de00h 
Greece
a) GR gr00h 
Hungary HU hu99h 
Ireland
a) IE ie00h 
Italy
a) IT  it00h 
Luxembourg
a) LU  lu00h 
Norway NO no00h 
Poland PL  pl99h 
Russia RU  ru00h 
Slovenia SI  si99h 
Spain
a) ES  es00h 
Sweden SE se00h 
Switzerland CH  ch00h 
United Kingdom UK  uk99h 







Table A2. Gini coefficients by subgroups 
Countr
y  A1C0 A1C1 A1C2 A1C3 A2C0 A2C1 A2C2 A1C3 A3C0 
AT  26.40 17.93 20.67  9.70  27.80 22.29 22.91 24.17 26.40 
(1.12) (2.44) (4.58) (4.87) (1.12) (2.13) (1.49) (3.79) (1.12) 
BE  27.28 20.47 24.59 12.17 44.16 24.04 24.85 21.75 27.28 
(1.90) (3.27) (4.43) (4.90)  (10.24)  (3.34) (1.65) (2.31) (1.90) 
EE  35.81 33.48 26.39 24.79 35.97 35.54 34.40 33.43 35.81 
(1.46) (3.58) (2.16) (3.06) (1.44) (1.62) (1.17) (3.12) (1.46) 
FI  26.49 20.52 16.44 14.82 25.52 21.00 19.86 22.53 26.49 
(0.86) (1.52) (1.40) (3.00) (0.79) (1.40) (0.94) (2.31) (0.86) 
FR  30.91 26.61 24.04 23.98 28.54 24.53 24.97 24.76 30.91 
(0.56) (1.50) (1.70) (3.59) (0.50) (0.79) (0.74) (1.24) (0.56) 
DE  30.83 23.17 30.00 12.58 27.80 24.55 24.11 22.66 30.83 
(0.86) (1.43) (3.29) (1.86) (0.62) (0.95) (1.75) (1.27) (0.86) 
GR  39.97 34.49 35.60  0.00  35.46 31.16 30.80 27.83 39.97 
(1.77) (7.19) (5.14) (0.00) (1.08) (1.44) (1.47) (2.70) (1.77) 
HU  31.19 31.90 16.47 14.98 28.18 34.06 26.67 25.30 31.19 
(2.51) (5.41) (3.92) (7.43) (1.34) (2.96) (1.39) (4.96) (2.51) 
IE  42.58 21.10 19.81 16.93 35.20 31.76 23.57 31.64 42.58 
(6.71) (2.13) (3.29) (4.48) (1.36) (5.30) (1.54) (3.71) (6.71) 
IT  34.51 26.34 29.68 29.22 34.48 29.71 30.44 39.95 34.51 
(1.28) (2.63) (5.21) (7.98) (1.18) (1.11) (1.24) (5.18) (1.28) 
LU  27.96 21.36 25.54 10.44 27.17 23.21 25.15 24.08 27.96 
(1.33) (1.97) (5.08) (5.23) (0.86) (0.93) (1.22) (2.02) (1.33) 
NO  27.49 21.93 17.27 12.01 26.21 19.18 20.89 25.50 27.49 
(0.62) (2.09) (1.84) (2.24) (1.02) (0.92) (1.68) (4.33) (0.62) 
PL  27.50 30.80 26.77 25.48 27.06 30.10 30.04 30.21 27.50 
(0.45) (1.31) (1.38) (2.91) (0.39) (0.46) (0.49) (0.84) (0.45) 
RU  41.85 50.37 44.71  0.00  44.59 50.06 43.70 55.37 41.85 
(2.53) (3.07) (6.94) (0.00) (3.79) (3.41) (1.76) (7.52) (2.53) 
SI  29.20  24.09  29.27 --- 28.40  23.23 21.30 21.16 29.20 
(1.41) (3.56) (5.54)  (---)  (0.95) (1.10) (1.24) (1.95) (1.41) 
ES  38.70 29.18 36.92 32.77 35.64 30.49 34.07 43.39 38.70 
(1.25) (5.33) (5.17)  (14.48)  (1.46) (1.60) (1.08) (4.73) (1.25) 
SE  26.72 21.03 16.87 14.08 24.04 20.66 22.79 21.23 26.72 
(0.42) (2.08) (1.68) (2.86) (0.40) (1.06) (2.93) (1.77) (0.42) 
CH  31.67 18.70 26.96 17.63 28.69 26.46 22.25 25.65 31.67 
(1.90) (2.24) (3.07) (2.66) (1.18) (4.47) (1.11) (1.87) (1.90) 
UK  36.96 23.73 22.22 17.96 34.99 30.37 32.73 32.21 36.96 
(1.33) (0.69) (0.89) (1.16) (0.47) (0.58) (1.28) (1.30) (1.33) 
US 
40.57 35.82 39.17 35.79 36.44 34.93 33.54 34.55 40.57 
(0.37) (1.49) (1.99) (2.15) (0.39) (0.69) (0.63) (0.85) (0.37) 
Note. A denotes adult; C denotes child. The adjacent figure gives the respective number of household members. Standard 
errors in parentheses. 
 
  